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I.

Introduction

Americans and their policy makers are increasingly recognizing the environmental and economic impacts of
America's reliance on the automobile. 1 The most successful
and developed policy remedies to these impacts-improved
fuel efficiency standards and gasoline taxes-are bogged
down in a political impasse. As a result, complementary approaches are being designed in an effort to develop a package
* Through June 1994, Nathanael Greene worked as an energy policy analyst for the Natural Resources Defense Council in New York. He received his
B-A. in public policy from Brown University and is currently working on an
M.A. at U.C. Berkeley's Energy and Resources Group.
** Vanessa Ward received her A.B. from Harvard College, where she completed course work in environmental law and conducted independent studies at
a Boston environmental law firm. She co-authored this article while working as
a Research Fellow in the Urban and Energy Programs of the Natural Resources
Defense Council.
1. For a full discussion of these impacts and estimates of the damage they
cause, see Charles Komanoff & Brian Keteham, Win-Win: Transportation: A
No-Losers Approach to Financing Transportation in New York City and the Region (July 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Komanoff Energy Associ-

ates) and

PETER MILER & JOHN MoFFT, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE

CoUNciL, THE PRICE OF MOBILITY: UNCOVERING THE HIDDEN COSTS OF TRANSPORTATION (Oct. 1993).
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of options that will make standards and taxes more palatable. Some of these new options rely primarily on marketbased incentives aimed at sending the right price signals for
vehicle-miles-traveled (VMT). However, the two programs
described in this paper, Demand Based Reduction in Vehicle
Emissions Plus Increased Fuel Economy (Drive+) and the
Dealer Scrappage Program, use direct financial incentives to
influence consumer technology choices.
These programs are designed to promote retirement of
the least efficient automobiles and light-duty trucks and to
encourage the purchase of cleaner, more efficient vehicles.
They recognize that for the foreseeable future, the personal
automobile will continue to play a major part in American
transportation. Though both programs could be implemented
in any state and on the federal level, the specifics discussed
herein were developed with New York in mind.
II. The Setting
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (CAAA)2 and the

Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA)3 represent the widest acknowledgments yet of the environmental impacts of America's reliance on the automobile.
These two pieces of legislation contemplate a major shift in
the focus of state transportation planning away from
automobiles and highways to a fuller array of alternatives,
including public transportation, ride-sharing, walking and
cycling.
Unfortunately, the Corporate Average Fuel Economy
(CAFE) standards 4 and the federal gasoline tax, which have
produced the greatest increases in vehicle efficiency since the
1970's, are now dividing decision-makers. A standoff has
formed between the environmental community and the automobile industry. Environmentalists have supported increasing CAFE standards and gasoline taxes, while the industry
2. Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
3. 49 U.S.C. §§ 5501-5907 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
4. The CAFE program was established in Title V of the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Saving Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2001-13 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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has opposed CAFE but generally supported gasoline taxes.
The result has been increases in gasoline taxes that are too
small to have an impact on automobile efficiency and a stalling of CAFE standards at mid-1980's levels.5
Within the last few years, the CAAA, ISTEA and the
leadership shown by California have increased the policy options. However, the standards laid out in the CAAA and in
California's Low Emission Vehicle (LEV) program 6 are meeting the same resistance from the automobile industry that
CAFE is. The LEV standards are already being challenged in
every state that has adopted them, including California.7
Environmental advocates must therefore develop a
broader set of policy tools so that emissions reductions and
efficiency gains become politically viable. These policies
should also provide incentives to make improvements beyond
the mandated standards. The most promising approach relies on packaging market-based incentives that adjust the
price signals sent to consumers, which would provide the automobile industry with economic incentives to achieve environmental policy goals. Smog fees that increase registration
charges on vehicles which produce high pollution levels are
an example of adjusting automobile pricing by internalizing
the cost of emissions. Other examples include congestion
pricing measures, such as peak and off-peak toll pricing, and
"pay-as-you-drive" insurance which would link insurance premiums to the number of miles driven.8
5. CAFE standards for passenger cars reached a high in 1985 of 27.5 miles
per gallon only to be rolled back to 26 in 1986. Only in 1990 did the standard
reach the 27.5 level again. JAms J. MAcKE~ziE & MICHAEL P. WALSH, WORLD
RESOURCES INSTITUTE, DRIVING FORCES: MOTOR VEHICLE TRENDS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR GLOBAL WARMING, ENERGY STRATEGIES, AND TRANSPORTATION

22 (Dec. 1990).
6. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 43800-806 (West 1986 & Supp.
1994).
7. Mark Rechtin, Big 3 See Delay in '98 Calif EV Edict, AUTOMOTIVE
NEWS, Nov. 22, 1993, at 1, 34.
8. For a more complete discussion of fees on the harms caused by driving,
see TRI-STATE TRANSPORTATION CAMPAIGN, CITIZEN'S ACTION PLAN (Apr. 1994)
and Komanoff & Ketcham, supra note 1. The Tri-State Transportation Campaign can be reached at the Environmental Defense Fund's offices in New York.
PLANNING
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III. Drive+ and Dealer Scrappage
Fees and pricing measures such as those described
above, would increase the price of driving, especially at certain peak periods. The Drive+ and Dealer Scrappage Program focus instead on ensuring that the automobiles on the
road today are cleaner and more efficient.
A. Drive+: How It Works
Under Drive+, which has been introduced twice in the
California legislature, new automobiles and light-duty trucks
sold would be assigned either a fee or a rebate at their point
of sale, based on their emissions and efficiency relative to the
new-vehicle fleet average. 9 This provides both a "stick" and
"carrot" to improve the efficiency and emissions of new
vehicles.
The fee or rebate assessed would be based on the difference between the emissions of the automobile or light-duty
truck purchased and the new-vehicle fleet average emissions 10 of carbon monoxide (CO), hydrocarbons (HC), nitrous
oxides (NO.), and carbon dioxide (C0 2); both in its capacity as
a greenhouse gas, and as a gauge for efficiency), measured in
grams per mile. For each criterion, the difference is multiplied by a dollar per gram per mile value, which represents
the cost of those emissions to society. 11 The total rebate or
fee a vehicle receives represents a sum of the rebate or fee for
each pollutant emitted, and thus measures the vehicle's over9. The most recent version of the "Demand-based Reduction in Vehicle
Emissions (Plus reductions in C02)," or Drive+, program was introduced as Cal.
S. 378, Reg. Sess. (1993) by Senator Hart on Feb. 23, 1993.
10. The averages for these criteria are based on EPA's new and 50,000 mile
certification data for all cars and trucks manufactured. The average must then
be weighed according to projected sales to produce a projected new-vehicle fleet
average.
11. Determining the societal costs of pollution is an analytically challenging
process. However, while the incentives should be based on the societal cost,
much of the desired effect can be achieved with values that are chosen politically. California Senate Bill No. 378 proposed initial values of $1925 per gram
per mile of HC, $2200 per gram per mile of NO., $220 per gram per mile of CO,
$2.50 per gram per mile of C02, and $586 per gram per mile of particulates. Cal.
S. 378, Reg. Sess. (1993). This would result in about a $3000 range in fees and
rebates, for all vehicles considered.
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all emissions and efficiency performance. By changing the
value assigned to the different criteria, a state can weigh the
importance of the emissions relative to each other. Furthermore, by adjusting the size of the fees collected relative to the
rebates, the program could be revenue neutral and avoid the
stigma associated with new tax proposals.
Drive+ works on two levels: it makes cleaner, more efficient vehicles more affordable to buy, and makes them more
profitable to sell. To maximize both of these effects, Drive+
would best be implemented at the federal level. However,
even at the state level, initial modeling by Lawrence Berkeley
Laboratories (LBL) shows Drive+ could reduce emissions of
HC, NO., C02 and CO from new automobiles and light-duty
trucks by as much as 3.5% in the first year through consumer
response alone. 12 This analysis assumes that incentives
would range from a $1750 fee to a $1200 rebate and that consumers are choosing more efficient vehicles from those currently available. 13 Further modeling by LBL suggests that
the manufacturers would have a much greater impact on the
reductions in emissions by improving their model lines. 14
The combined impact could be particularly significant if
Drive+ is implemented on the federal level or in a few large
states such as New York, which accounts for between 6 and
7% of new automobile sales nationwide. The LBL modeling
suggests that Drive+ could play an important role in state
efforts to meet CAAA requirements. 5 Similarly, the incentives would help reduce reliance on imported oil. In addition,

12. Memorandum from William Davis, Energy Analysis Program, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, to Lew Fulton 1 (Dec. 23, 1992) (on file with
author).
13. Id. at 4.
14. WiLIAM DAviS ET AL., ENERGY ANALYSIS PROGRAM, LAWRENCE BERKELEY LABORATORY, THE DESIGN AND IMPACTS OF FEEBATES 9-11 (Sept. 1994).
This modeling showed an increase in new vehicle efficiency for cars of between
12 and 18% and for trucks of between 10 and 13% by 2010. This results in a
cumulative savings from 1995-2010 of between 660 and 890 million tons of C02
emissions and between 66.7 and 89.9 billion gallons of gasoline. Id. at 14.
15. Id. at 1.
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cleaner air and more efficient vehicles mean savings to con16
sumers through reduced medical and fuel bills.

In basing the total incentive on the sum of the differences
within each criterion, Drive+ challenges the popular notion
that increases in efficiency and reductions in emissions are
antithetical. There are two reasons for believing that the incentives for efficiency will not be canceled out by those for
emissions. First, emissions control technology is improving.
Even now, any one pollutant can be controlled to almost any
level if cost is not considered. Second, vehicles on the market
already generally adhere to the rule "less fuel in-less emissions out."
The accuracy of this rule can be seen by grouping vehicles by their efficiency and studying the average emissions for
each group. As predicted, vehicles in the more efficient groupings have lower average emissions and the less efficient
groupings have higher emissions.17 The only pollutant that
does not currently adhere to this rule is nitrogen oxide emissions from automobiles. 18 The accuracy of this rule is further
evidenced by comparing car emissions averaged over efficiency groupings to truck emissions. Emissions controls for
trucks have received much less emphasis than controls for
cars. Therefore emissions from trucks more closely represent
the emissions of different engines without the variations
caused by different control technologies. By looking at the
emissions by efficiency grouping for trucks, a better picture
emerges showing how emissions relate to fuel consumption
absent controls. As predicted, more efficient trucks have
much lower emissions than less efficient trucks for all pollutants including nitrogen oxide. 19 Conversely, because emissions from car engines are more controlled, the20relationship
between car emissions and efficiency is weaker.
16. A draft report on more modeling done by LBL predicts that fees and
rebates done at the federal level and designed solely to increase efficiency would
produce an increase in consumer surplus of $70-91 per household per year in
2010. Id. at 14.
17. See figures 1-4 and 6.
18. See figure 5.
19. See figures 2, 4 and 6.
20. See figures 1, 2 and 5.
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Drive+ has two further advantages as a policy option.
First, Drive+ would work well with the California LEV program, which is the only set of emissions standards that states
are allowed to adopt other than the federal ones. 2 1 The LEV
program sets average fleet emissions standards for a variety
of pollutants. Since Drive+'s incentives are based on the fleet
average, the Drive+ program will continue to push and pull
the market even when LEV goes into effect. Second, since
Drive+ is a variation on states' existing motor vehicle tax and
registration fee policy and does not set standards, the program should not run afoul of the federal preemption of state
fuel efficiency standards.
B.

Dealer Scrappage: How It Works

The Dealer Scrappage Program has two goals: to encourage retirement of the most inefficient and polluting vehicles and to ensure that the vehicles which replace the retired
ones are as clean and efficient as possible. Calculating one
incentive to achieve both these goals is challenging, even in
theory, and requires extensive data. For this reason, the program is primarily envisioned for parts of the country where
enhanced inspection and maintenance (I/M) is federally mandated and can provide more complete data on the existing
fleet. The incentive, or "scrappage bounty," would be offered
to dealers only on trade-ins that fail to meet local emissions
requirements, contingent upon those trade-ins being
scrapped. Furthermore the bounty would be based, in part,
on the difference in emissions between the trade-in and the
replacement vehicle, thus encouraging dealers to sell the cle22
anest automobiles and light-duty trucks possible.
Policy makers should realize that the Dealer Scrappage
Program, still in its initial development stage, would not encompass the ideal scrappage candidate: a passenger vehicle
owner who drives a dirty gas-guzzler but who would be will21. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7582-84 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
22. The concept for a bounty based on the difference between a trade-in and
new purchase was originally proposed by Amory Lovins of the Rocky Mountain

Institute.
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ing to retire it and start using alternative transportation. 23
However, the proposal does address two major problems
posed by scrappage programs which offer a fixed bounty for
all vehicles. Simple scrappage programs with one fixed
bounty would encourage people to retire back-yard junkers
that had already been removed from the road. Though these
junkers may theoretically have high emissions per mile, the
total emissions cost society less than the bounty, since they
are not being driven. The Dealer Scrappage Program-solves
this problem by making the bounty proportional to the annual mileage of the trade-in during the most recent year.
Even if a simple scrappage program sets the fixed bounty
equal to the average annual emissions savings based on the
average vehicle predicted, this program would also tend to
over-estimate the actual reductions and thus pay too much.
This error occurs if participants in the program replaced their
scrapped vehicles with other heavy polluters, thus minimizing the net reductions. By basing the bounty in part on the
difference between the trade-in and the replacement, the
bounty in the Dealer Scrappage Program is proportional to
24
the emissions savings that actually occur.
The bounty would be calculated as the dollar value to society of the difference in annual emissions, including CO2 as a
surrogate for efficiency, between the trade-in and the vehicle
sold. The value of the emissions would be calculated on a
grams per year basis which requires multiplying the emissions per mile by miles driven per year. The miles driven per
year would be determined by the annual miles driven in the
trade-in. For example, if a person trades in a vehicle with
emissions with a cost to society of $1750 and replaces it with
a car that if driven the same amount as the trade-in would
have emissions worth $750, then the bounty would be $1000.
The bounty would be capped, however, at the total cost of
the repairs which would be required to bring the trade-in into
23. Ideal modes of alternative transportation which would not produce additional air pollutants include mass transit, cycling or walking.
24. MAmiKA TATSUTANI, ENERGY & RESOURCES GRouP, UNIVERsITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY, UNOcAL CoRPoRATIoN's SCRAP: AN EXPERIMENT iN CoRPORATE ENvIRONmENTAL INITIATIvE 41-47 (May 1991).
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compliance with local emissions standards. Thus if the emissions worth $1000 could be eliminated through $500 worth of
repairs, the bounty would be $500. On the other hand, if the
repairs would cost $1500, the bounty would stay at $1000.
The final adjustment to the bounty is to exclude the cost of
any repairs mandated by law. Thus, continuing our example,
if the repairs could be made for $500, but in New York the It
M program mandated expenditures up to $450, the bounty
would only be $50.
If a dealer thought he or she could resell the trade-in for
more than $500 (the bounty plus the required expenditure on
repairs) then the dealer presumably would not accept the
bounty. But if the vehicle's value was less than $500, the
bounty would sway the dealer to scrap the vehicle, saving so25
ciety $1000 worth of emissions.
While the formula for the bounty - the lesser of either
the societal value of the difference in emissions or the cost of
repairs - is relatively simple, collecting the required information presents dilemmas. For example, the annual miles
driven in the trade-in and the emissions per mile of both the
trade-in and the replacement must be recorded. While this
data could be collected in some areas through enhanced I/M,
the program would need to guard against the large potential
for fraud. Two less easily solved problems are determining
the total cost of repairs and the societal cost of emissions. Determining the cost of repairs raises the problem of potential
tampering with emissions controls to increase the bounty or
preset values for different types of repairs that are imprecise
and inflexible. Determining societal values is both a politically and analytically daunting task.
IV. Conclusion
Drive+ and the Dealer Scrappage Program are at different stages of development in New York. The Dealer Scrappage Program still needs input from experts on automobile
emissions, enhanced I/M, and the used-car market to help define important administrative components and data require25. Figure 7 offers a decision tree for the program.
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ments. Both programs also need state specific modeling. The
modeling will be vital to adjusting the value attached to
cleaner more efficient vehicles in the future and to assessing
the impacts on emissions to be counted towards CAAA requirements. However, legislatures need not wait for this
modeling to implement these programs. We know that the
value of these emissions is measurable, and even small fees
and rebates will provide the right financial incentives.
These two policy options promise real reductions in
wasted fuel and emissions and, as part of a larger package, a
way to break the current policy gridlock. While CAFE, LEV,
and gasoline taxes have a crucial role to play, the pace of
change will increase only by broadening the options available
to policy makers.
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Figure 2
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Figure 7
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